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Abstract—Ethereum is the largest blockchain platform that
supports smart contracts. Users deploy smart contracts by
publishing the smart contract’s bytecode to the blockchain. Since
the data in the blockchain cannot be modified, even if these
contracts contain bugs, it is not possible to patch deployed smart
contracts with code updates. Moreover, there is currently neither
a comprehensive classification framework for Ethereum smart
contract bugs, nor detailed criteria for detecting bugs in smart
contracts, making it difficult for developers to fully understand
the negative effects of bugs and design new approaches to detect
bugs. In this paper, to fill the gap, we first collect as many
smart contract bugs as possible from multiple sources and divide
these bugs into 9 categories by extending the IEEE Standard
Classification for Software Anomalies. Then, we design the criteria
for detecting each kind of bugs, and construct a dataset of smart
contracts covering all kinds of bugs. With our framework and
dataset, developers can learn smart contract bugs and develop
new tools to detect and locate bugs in smart contracts. Moreover,
we evaluate the state-of-the-art tools for smart contract analysis
with our dataset and obtain some interesting findings: 1) Mythril,
Slither and Remix are the most worthwhile combination of
analysis tools. 2) There are still 10 kinds of bugs that cannot
be detected by any analysis tool.
Index Terms—Ethereum, Solidity, Smart contract bug
I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of smart contracts have been deployed onto
Ethereum, the largest blockchain that supports smart contracts.
They are typically developed with high-level programming
languages and then compiled into bytecode, which will be
deployed to the blockchain through transactions. Note that
the deployed bytecode cannot be modified for patching the
bugs. Unfortunately, similar to traditional computer programs,
it is difficult to avoid bugs in smart contracts. Recent years
have witnessed various bugs in smart contracts, resulting in
huge losses. e.g., the re-entrancy bug [1] in the DAO smart
contract [2] led to a loss of $60 million.
Although recent studies proposed a number of tools [3]–
[14] for detecting the bugs in smart contracts, Ye et al. [15]
found that they can only discover some kinds of known smart
contract bugs. One possible reason for this situation is the lack
of a comprehensive collection and classification of all existing
smart contract bugs so that existing tools just aim at portions
of bugs. At the same time, recent studies reveal that one major
reason for the prevalence of smart contract bugs is the lack of
a comprehensive classification framework for smart contract
bugs [1]. Although a few studies summarized and classified
some kinds of bugs in smart contracts [1], [16]–[18], they have
the following limitations:
• Existing studies do not cover all known bugs in smart
contracts. Dingman et al. [16] considered 49 kinds of bugs and
classified them using NIST framework. However, they grouped
only 24 kinds of bugs into well-defined categories, and put
the remaining 25 kinds of bugs into other category without
further classification. Moreover, they also included the bugs
that have been fixed. Smartdec [19] divided smart contract
bugs into three levels: blockchain, language and model, and
then classified the bugs at each level. Chen et al. [17] divided
20 kinds of bugs into 5 categories. Durieux et al. [18] divided
bugs into 10 categories. However, only partial known bugs
were covered by these studies.
• Lack of detailed bug detection criteria. Existing work [1],
[16]–[18] only describes the causes of various bugs without
giving the criteria for finding such bugs, making it difficult
for developers to design algorithms and tools to detect bugs.
For example, it is difficult for existing tools to detect the short
address attack bug due to the lack of detection criteria.
• Existing datasets for smart contract bugs are incomplete.
e.g., SmartContractSecurity [20] includes 33 kinds of bugs,
but only provides sample smart contracts for 31 kinds of bugs;
crytic [21] provides sample smart contracts that cover 12 kinds
of bugs; Durieux et al. [18] provide a dataset containing 69
problematic smart contracts, but they only covered 10 kinds
of bugs. Without a dataset that covers all kinds of known bugs
and the corresponding vulnerable smart contracts, it is difficult
to comprehensively evaluate the performance of existing tools
designed for finding bugs in smart contracts.
To fill the gap, in this paper, we first carefully collect
known bugs in Ethereum smart contracts from many sources,
including, academic literature, the Web, blogs, and related
open-source projects, and finally obtain 323 records describing
bugs in Ethereum smart contract. Then, by reviewing the
Ethereum Wiki [22], Ethereum Improvement Proposals [23]
and the development documents of Solidity [24], we remove
the bugs that had been fixed by Ethereum. We also merge
the bugs caused by the same behavior, and eventually get 49
kinds of bugs. After that, by extending the IEEE Standard
Classification for Software Anomalies, we classify the 49 kinds
of bugs into 9 categories, and provide the detection criteria for
each kind of bug. Finally, we construct a dataset of vulnerable
smart contract covering all these bugs, and use it to evaluate
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the state-of-the-art tools for analyzing smart contracts. We call
the framework and dataset as Jiuzhou, which can be found at
https://github.com/xf97/JiuZhou.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a new framework for all known bugs in smart
contracts by extending IEEE Standard Classification for
Software Anomalies. We collect these bugs from many
sources and classify them into 9 categories.
• We design the detection criteria for each kind of bug
by taking into account the cause of each bug, the most
common form of bugs, and the potential false positives
and negatives generated by various detection tools.
• We construct a dataset of problematic smart contracts,
which cover all kinds of known bugs. It contains 176
smart contracts, including contracts that contain bugs,
contracts with bugs fixed and crafted contracts. By study-
ing the smart contracts in this dataset, developers and
researchers can understand the patterns of these bugs and
the corresponding solutions.
• We use our dataset as a benchmark to evaluate the state-
of-the-art smart contract analysis tools. The empirical
results show the detection abilities of nine smart contract
analysis tools and reveal that there are still 10 kinds of
bugs that cannot be detected by any of these tools.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the necessary background. Section 3 presents the
framework for smart contract bugs. For each bug, we not only
describe its characteristics and severity level, but also design
the corresponding detection criteria. Section 4 introduces the
dataset that covers all these bugs. Section 5 reports the results
of using our dataset to evaluate smart contract analysis tools.
After introducing the related work in Section 6, we conclude
the paper with future work in Section 7.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Smart contract
When the conditions specified in the contract are met or the
smart contracts are called, smart contracts will be executed
automatically on blockchain [25]. In Ethereum, each smart
contract or user is assigned a unique address. Smart contracts
can be invoked by sending transactions to the address of the
contract [26]. Ether is the cryptocurrency used by Ethereum,
and both contracts and users can trade ethers. To avoid abusing
the computational resources, Ethereum charges gas from each
executed smart contract statement [27].
B. Solidity
Being the most widely used programming language for
developing Ethereum smart contracts [24], Solidity is a Turing-
complete and high-level programming language capable of
expressing arbitrarily complex logic. Before deployment, the
smart contracts written by Solidity are compiled into bytecode
of Ethereum virtual machine (EVM). Solidity provides many
built-in symbols to perform various functions of Ethereum.
For example, transfer and send are used to transfer ethers,
and require and assert are used to handle errors. Solidity
is a fast-evolving language. The same keyword may have
different semantics in different versions. Fortunately, when
using Solidity to develop smart contracts, developers can
specify the Solidity version used by the contracts.
C. IEEE Standard Classification for Software Anomalies
The IEEE Standard Classification for Software Anoma-
lies [28] provides a unified method for the classification of
traditional software anomalies. In the standard, error, fault,
defect, problem, and bug are uniformly described as anomalies.
In its latest version, software anomalies are classified into six
categories: data, interface, logic, description, syntax, standard.
The standard also provides ranking criteria for the effect and
priority of software anomalies. It can be extended for covering
different types of software.
III. A CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK FOR SMART
CONTRACT BUGS
To build a comprehensive classification framework, we
collect smart contract bugs from many sources, including
academic literature, the Web, blogs, and related open-source
projects. Since there is no uniform bug naming standard, the
same bug may have different names. Consequently, we first
merge bugs according to their behaviors. Then, according to
the causes of all bugs, we divided all bugs into 9 categories.
Each category contains several sub-categories, and the sub-
categories contain several kinds of bugs. Finally, according to
the effect of different bugs, we give each bug a severity level.
A. Collect smart contract bugs
First, we collect smart contract bugs from academic lit-
erature, the Web, blogs, and other resources. For academic
literature, we use smart contract vulnerabilities, smart contract
bugs, smart contract defects, smart contract problems, and
smart contract anomalies as search keywords to search for
papers published since 2014 in ACM digital library [29] and
IEEE Xplore digital library [30]. The reason for the paper after
2014 was chosen is that Ethereum started ICO (initial coin
offering) in 2014. For the Web and blogs, we mainly focus on
the Github homepage of Ethereum [31], the development doc-
uments of Solidity [24], the official blogs of Ethereum [32], the
Gitter chat room [33], Ethereum Improvement Proposals [23]
and other resources.
Second, the open-source projects are also our focus since
the open-source community plays an important role in the
field of software security [34]. Specifically, we use smart
contract bugs, smart contract problems, smart contract defects,
smart contract vulnerabilities, and smart contract anomalies
as search keywords to retrieve related open-source projects
on GitHub [35]. Besides, many smart contract analysis tool
projects are also open-sourced on GitHub [35], and some of
the project documents describe information about smart con-
tract bugs. Therefore, we also use smart contract analysis tools
and smart contract security as search keywords to retrieve
open-source projects on Github. We focus on the projects for
Ethereum smart contracts. After removing duplicate search
results, we obtain a total of 266 projects.
Third, since some famous Ethereum smart contract analysis
tools can detect smart contract bugs, we sent emails to the
authors of these tools asking what kinds of bugs they can
detect. We also look at the kinds of bugs detected by the
Solidity static analysis function of Remix [36]. Finally, from
the resources mentioned above, we collected 323 records
describing Ethereum smart contract bugs.
To continuously collect bugs, we develop a program called
BugGetter1, which runs regularly (by default 15 days) and
sends query requests to Github. BugGetter uses keywords
such as smart contract vulnerabilities, smart contract bugs,
smart contract defects, smart contract problems, smart con-
tract security, and smart contract analysis tools to construct
query requests to Github, and extract the list of projects and
their update time from the response. By comparing previously
obtained projects and their update time, BugGetter will send
us an email if a new project appears or an existing project is
updated. After receiving the email, we will manually check
all changes and update the collected bug results in time.
B. Merge smart contract bugs
Since there is no uniform bug naming standard, some bugs
are actually the same even if they have different names.
Therefore, we need to merge the duplicate bugs. The collected
bugs generally have two attributes, namely, the behaviors
causing the bug and the consequences caused by the bug. If
there is a bug A. Let,
• the behaviors causing bug A be b(A),
• the consequences caused by bug A be c(A).
Given two bugs A and B, we handle them as follows:
1) If b(A) 6= b(B), we do not merge A and B. 2) If
b(A) = b(B), c(A) 6= c(B), c(A) and c(B) cover part of the
consequences of the bug. Hence, we merge A and B, rename
the merged bug, summarize c(A) and c(B) as the consequences
caused by the merged bug. 3) If b(A) = b(B), c(A) = c(B),
we merge A and B and choose the name that better character-
izes the bug as the name of the merged bug.
After the duplicate bugs are merged, we verify the validity
of each bug (i.e., the bug has not been permanently fixed
by Ethereum), and delete the fixed bugs. Finally, 49 kinds
of bugs are left. The bugs before and after the merging step
can be found at https://github.com/xf97/JiuZhou/blob/master/
Correspondence.xlsx.
C. Classify smart contract bugs
C.1 Classification criteria and results:
According to IEEE Standard Classification for Software
Anomalies [28] issued in 2010, software anomalies are clas-
sified into six categories: data, interface, logic, description,
syntax, standard. Among them, we do not consider the syntax
category, because a smart contract with syntax bugs can be
neither compiled into bytecode nor deployed to Ethereum.
1https://github.com/xf97/BugGetter
Note that some bugs are specific to Ethereum, such as the
bugs caused by gas, lack of privacy on the blockchain, smart
contract authority control, smart contract interactions, and
smart contract support software. Since they cannot be accu-
rately classified by IEEE Standard Classification for Software
Anomalies [28], we add four new categories: security (for
lack of privacy and authority control), performance (for gas
consumption), interaction (for smart contract interaction and
ethers exchange), and environment (for smart contract support
software). Consequently, we divide smart contract bugs into
the following nine categories lexicographically:
1) Data. Bugs in data definition, initialization, mapping,
access, or use, as found in a model, specification, or
implementation.
2) Description. Bugs in the description of the software or
its use, installation, or operation.
3) Environment. Bugs due to errors in the supporting
software.
4) Interaction. Bugs that cause by interaction with other
Ethereum addresses.
5) Interface. Bugs in specification or implementation of an
interface.
6) Logic. Bugs in decision logic, branching, sequencing, or
a computational algorithm, as found in natural language
specifications or implementation language.
7) Performance. Bugs that cause increased gas consump-
tion.
8) Security. Bugs that threaten contract security, such as
authentication, privacy/confidentiality, property.
9) Standard. Nonconformity with a defined standard.
When merging bugs, we check Ethereum Improvement
Proposals [23], the Ethereum Wiki [22], and the development
documents of Solidity [24] to remove the bugs that have been
fixed by Ethereum (e.g., the call depth attack, which was fixed
in EIP150 [37]). Some kinds of bugs are caused by specific
Solidity versions. Since it is still possible to use these versions
of Solidity to develop smart contracts, we list the range of
Solidity versions that cause these kinds of bugs. The remaining
kinds of bugs exist in any version of Solidity.
We divide 49 kinds of bugs into 9 categories, each
of which is divided into several sub-categories, and each
sub-category contains several kinds of bugs. Fig 1 shows the
classification of 49 kinds of bugs. For ease of expression,
we assign a corresponding abbreviated name to each bug.
The composition rule of the abbreviated name is: category
number-subcategory number-short name. The short name is
an acronym that can be distinguished from the short names
of other kinds of bugs in the same sub-category. Since
classifying bugs based on their descriptions is a manual
process based on natural language descriptions, it may
introduce the subjectivity and ambiguity. To mitigate the
impact of this problem, three researchers who are familiar
with smart contract bugs participated in the classification
process and reached a consensus through discussion. Due to
space limit, in this paper, we only introduce some kinds of
Fig. 1. Smart contract bug statistics and classification
bugs in detail. For the full version, please visit this url2.
C.2 Selected kinds of smart contract bugs
In this part, we introduce the causes, consequences, and
detection criteria of seven kinds of bugs in detail, and illustrate
these bugs with examples. Some of these bugs are difficult to
understand the attack process while others are not mentioned
in other studies [1], [16], [17]. Table I lists these bugs.
TABLE I
7 KINDS OF BUGS INTRODUCED IN DETAIL
Bug name
abbreviation
A-a-IS, A-a-W, A-c-US, D-a-R
E-a-SA, E-a-SW, F-c-T
Integer Sign (A-a-IS) [5]:
• Cause: In Solidity, Converting int type to uint type (and
vice versa) may produce incorrect results.
• Consequence: This kind of bugs may result in incorrect
integer operation results, which will affect the function of
the contract. When the wrong result is used to indicate
the number of ethers (or tokens), this kind of bugs will
cause economic losses.
• Example: Consider the smart contract in Fig 2, if the
attacker calls the withdrawOnce function and specifies
that the value of amount is a negative number, then this
call will pass the check and transfer out the ether that
exceeds the limit (1 ether).
Fig. 2. A contract that contains integer sign bug
• Detection criteria: This kind of bugs exists when the con-
tract contains the following features: 1) Forcibly convert
an int variable to a uint variable. 2) The contract does
not check whether this int variable is negative.
Wrong Operator (A-a-W) [20]:
• Cause: Users can use =+ and =- operators in the integer
operation without compiling errors (up to and including
version 0.4.26).
• Consequence: Consistent with the consequences of inte-
ger sign bug.
• Example: Consider the smart contract in Fig 3, the user
can adjust the value of myNum by calling addOne/subOne
function. When myNum and WinNum are equal, the user
gets all the ethers of the contract. But because the
2https://github.com/xf97/JiuZhou/blob/master/Jiuzhou Full version.pdf
Fig. 3. A contract contains a wrong operator bug
developers write the wrong operators (Line 15, 19), the
value of myNum will not be changed.
• Detection criteria: This kind of bugs exists when the
following feature exists in the contract: 1) There is a =+
or =- operator in the contract.
Uninitialized Storage Variables (A-c-US) [20]:
• Cause: The uninitialized storage variable serves as a
reference to the first state variable in a contract, which
may cause the state variable to be inadvertently modified
(up to and including version 0.4.26).
• Consequence: This kind of bugs may cause key state
variables to be rewritten inadvertently, and eventually, the
function of the contract will be affected.
• Example: Consider the smart contract in Fig 4, when the
user calls the function func, the owner will be re-assigned
to 0x0.
Fig. 4. A contract contains a uninitialized storage variables bug
• Detection criteria: This kind of bugs exists when the
contract contains the following features: 1) the developers
do not initialize the storage variables in the contract.
Re-entrancy Vulnerability (D-a-R) [13], [38]:
• Cause: When the call-statement is used to call other
contracts, the callee can call back the caller and enter
the caller again.
• Consequence: This kind of bugs is one of the most
dangerous smart contract bugs, which will cause the
contract balance (ethers) to be stolen by attackers.
• Example: We use an example to illustrate the re-entrancy
vulnerability. In Fig 5, the contract Re is a contract with
a re-entrancy vulnerability, and the balance variable is
a map used to record the correspondence between the
address and the number of tokens. The attacker deploys
the contract Attack, and the value of the parameter
reAddr is set to the address of the contract Re. In this
way, the re variable becomes an instance of the contract
Re. Then,
– Step 1: The attacker calls the attack function to
deposit ethers into the contract Re and then calls the
Re.withdraw function to retrieve the deposited ethers.
– Step 2: The contract Re executes the withdraw
function and uses a call-statement to send ethers
to the contract Attack. At this time, the power of
control is transferred to the contract Attack, and the
contract Attack responds to the transfer using the
Attack.fallback function.
– Step 3: The Attack.fallback function calls the
Re.withdraw function to withdraw the ethers again.
Therefore, the statement (deduct-statement) deduct-
ing the number of tokens held by the contract Attack
will not be executed.
• Detection criteria: When the following features are in the
contract, it will cause the reentrancy bug: 1) The call-
statement is used to send ethers. 2) The amount of gas
to be carried is not specified. 3) No callee’s response
function is specified. 4) Ethers are transferred first and
callee’s balance is deduced later.
Short Address Attack (E-a-SA) [39]:
• Cause: When Ethereum packs transaction data if the data
contains the address type and the length of the address
type is less than 20 bits, subsequent data will be used to
make up the length of the address type.
• Consequence: An attacker can exploit this kind of bug to
manipulate much more tokens (Ethers) than he requested.
• Example: We use an example to illustrate short address
attacks.
– Step 1: Tom deploys token contract A on Ethereum,
which contains the sendCoin function. The code of
sendCoin is shown in Fig 6.
– Step 2: Jack buys 100 tokens of contract
A, then registers for an Ethereum account
with the last two digits zero (e.g.
0x1234567890123456789012345678901234567800).
– Step 3: Jack calls the function send-
Coin with the given parameters, to:
0x12345678901234567890123456789012345678
(missing last two digits 0), amount: 50.
– Step 4: The value of amount is less than 100, so it
passes the check. However, because the bits of to is
insufficient, the first two bits (0) of amount will be
added to the to when the transaction data is packed.
Therefore, to make up for the length of amount, the
Ethereum virtual machine will add 0 to the last two
bits. In the end, the value of amount is expanded
by four times.
• Detection criteria: When there are the following features
in the contract, it will cause the short address attack: 1)
The contract uses a function to transfer ethers or tokens.
2) The number of tokens (ethers) and the address for
receiving tokens (ethers) are provided by external users.
3) There is no operation to check the length of the
received tokens (ethers) address in the function.
Signature With Wrong Parameter (E-a-SW) [40]:
• Cause: When the parameters of the ecrecover() are
wrong, the ecrecover() will return 0x0.
• Consequence: This kind of bugs will allow the attacker
to pass the authentication and then the attacker can
manipulate the token (ethers) held by the 0x0 address.
• Example: Considering the smart contract in Fig 7, when
the attacker gives the wrong parameters (v, r, s) and the
value of the specified parameter id is 0x0, the attacker
can pass the identity verification (Line 10), which even-
tually leads to the ethers in the contract are destroyed.
• Detection criteria: This kind of bugs exists when the
contract contains the following features: 1) There is an
operation in the contract that uses the ecrecover() to
calculate the public key address. 2) The contract does
not deal with the case where the ecrecover() returns 0x0.
Transaction Order Dependence (F-c-T) [41]:
• Cause: Miners can decide which transactions are pack-
aged into the blocks and the order in which transactions
are packaged. The current main impact of this kind of
bugs is the approve function in the ERC20 token standard.
• Consequence: This kind of bugs will enable miners to
influence the results of transaction execution. If the results
of the previous transactions will have an impact on
the results of the subsequent transactions, miners can
influence the results of transactions by controlling the
order in which the transactions are packaged.
• Example: The approve function allows one address to
approve another address to spend tokens on his behalf.
The standard implementation of the approve function is
shown in Fig 8. We assume that Alice and Tom are two
Ethereum users, and Tom runs an Ethereum node. The
following steps reveal how Tom uses the transaction order
dependence bug to monetize:
– Step 1: Assume Alice has approved Tom to spend n
of the tokens she holds. Now Alice decides to change
Tom’s quota to m tokens, so Alice sends a transaction
to modify Tom’s quota.
– Step 2: Since Tom runs an Ethereum node, he knows
that Alice will change his quota to m tokens. Then,
Tom sends a transaction (e.g., Using the transferFrom
function of the ERC20 token standard to transfer n
tokens to himself) to spend Alice’s n tokens, and
pays a lot of gas to make his transaction executed
first.
– Step 3: The node that obtains the accounting right
packs transactions. Because Tom pays more gas,
Tom’s transaction will be executed before Alice’s
Fig. 5. An example of re-entrancy vulnerability
Fig. 6. Objective function of short address attack
Fig. 7. A contract contains a signature with wrong parameter bug
transaction. Therefore, Tom spent n tokens of Alice
first and then is granted a quota of m tokens by Alice,
which caused Alice to suffer losses.
• Detection criteria: This kind of bugs exists when the
contract contains the following features: 1) The con-
tract contains the approve function of the ERC20 token
standard. 2) In the approve function, the quota of the
approved address is set from one nonzero value to another
nonzero value.
D. Severity level of smart contract bugs
To help developers and researchers have a clear under-
standing of the consequence of each bug, we grade the
severity of each kind of bug. According to the IEEE Standard
Fig. 8. The standard implementation of the approve function in the ERC20
token standard.
Classification for Software Anomalies [28], we classify the
effect of bugs into the following four categories:
• Functionality. The required function cannot be per-
formed correctly (or an unwanted function is performed).
• Performance. Failure to meet performance requirements,
such as rising operating costs.
• Security. Failure to meet security requirements, such as
failure of authority control, privacy breaches, property
theft, etc.
• Serviceability. Failure to meet maintainability require-
ments, such as reduced code readability.
According to the harmfulness of the above four effects, the
grading criteria of these bugs are described as follows:
• Critical: These kinds of bugs must affect security.
• High: These kinds of bugs may affect security or neces-
sarily affect functionality.
• Middle: These kinds of bugs may affect the functionality
or necessarily affect performance.
• Low: These kinds of bugs may affect performance or
necessarily affect serviceability.
According to the grading criteria, the severity level of each
kind of bug is shown in Table II.
IV. Jiuzhou: A DATASET OF SMART CONTRACTS WITH BUGS
A. Overview
Jiuzhou provides examples of each kind of bugs to help
smart contract researchers and developers better understand
the bugs. The dataset can be used as a benchmark to evaluate
the abilities of smart contract analysis tools. Jiuzhou includes
176 smart contracts, covering all smart contract bugs studied
in this paper. For each kind of bug, Jiuzhou provides at least
a contract with the bug and a contract without the bug. We
also manually prepare some contracts that may cause existing
analytical tools to make mistakes. The reason for providing
such contracts is that the test cases used in the existing studies
to evaluate the abilities of smart contract analysis tools usually
only contain bugs without ”bug-like” statements that may
lead to false positives. Therefore, those tools have not been
thoroughly evaluated [34] . To address this issue, we use the
following strategies to construct the crafted contracts that may
mislead the smart contract analysis tools, and include them in
our dataset.
TABLE II
A CLASSIFICATION OF SEVERITY LEVELS OF EACH KIND OF BUG
Name Severity Name Severity Name Severity
A-a-ID High A-a-IO High A-a-IS High
A-a-IT High A-a-W High A-b-HB High
A-b-HS High A-b-I High A-c-UL High
A-c-US High B-a-R Middle C-a-D Middle
C-a-U Middle D-a-R Critical D-a-U High
D-b-F Middle D-b-L Critical D-b-P Middle
E-a-C High E-a-H High E-a-SA High
E-a-SW High E-b-T High F-a-R Middle
F-a-S Middle F-b-DBC Middle
F-b
-DBG Middle
F-b
-DBN High F-c-R Middle F-c-T Middle
F-d-S High G-a-B Low G-a-II Middle
G-a-IS Middle G-a-U Middle H-a-R High
H-a-S Critical H-a-U High H-a-WC Critical
H-a-
WCN High H-b-N High H-b-P High
I-a-I Low I-a-N Low I-a-T High
I-a-UC Low I-a-UD Low I-b-I Middle
I-b-F Middle
• Premise: According to whether detecting a bug relies on
its context, we divide the bugs into context-independent
bugs and context-dependent bugs. The former can be lo-
cated according to the specific statements (e.g., nonstan-
dard naming, byte[], wrong operator) whereas detecting
the latter needs to take into account the context statements
of the bug. We only create crated contracts for context-
dependent bugs.
• Strategy 1: This strategy divides the statement (or struc-
ture) that causes the bug into multiple statements or
multiple functions or multiple contracts. It can effectively
reduce the precision of static code scanning tools.
• Strategy 2: This strategy provides the statements (or
structures) that can fix the bug, but make the statements
(or structures) invalid or unreachable. It can induce anal-
ysis tools to miss the bug.
• Strategy 3: This strategy uses uncommon means to fix
the bug. It can mislead analysis tools to report a false
positive.
B. Smart contract sources
We collect smart contracts from the following three sources:
• Other smart contract datasets (e.g., [20], [21]). Since
most of these contracts are developed using some old
version of Solidity, we manually rewrite these smart
contracts using the latest version of Solidity and keep
the bugs.
• Sample code in the papers (e.g. [5]), or sample code for
smart contract audit checklists (e.g. [42]). Since most of
the sample code only contains one function or part of
the contract, we construct a complete smart contract to
include these sample codes.
• We manually develop smart contracts based on the fea-
tures of some kinds of bugs. For the bugs that have only
text descriptions without sample code, we prepare smart
contracts that contain them manually and assure that the
bugs can be trigger and cause the expected consequences.
Table III shows the distribution of the number of unchanged
smart contracts, modified smart contracts, and smart contracts
that are developed by ourselves.
TABLE III
NUMBERS OF THREE KINDS OF SMART CONTRACTS
Unchanged
smart contracts
Modified
smart contracts
Handwritten
smart contract
Num 21 69 86
C. Comparison with other datasets
All problematic smart contracts in the Jiuzhou dataset were
developed using the latest version (0.4.26, 0.5.16, or 0.6.2)
of Solidity. Compared with several commonly used smart
contract datasets [20], [21], [43], [44], Jiuzhou provides more
smart contracts, uses the latest versions of Solidity, and covers
more kinds of smart contract bugs. A comparison of Jiuzhou
with other commonly used datasets is shown in Table IV.
D. Usages of the Jiuzhou dataset
Our dataset are useful to different kinds of developers:
• For developers of smart contracts, they can learn the smart
contract bugs by reading these smart contracts.
• For developers of smart contract analysis tools, the Ji-
uzhou dataset can guide them to develop smart contract
analysis tools. They can learn the patterns of problematic
smart contracts that are prone to false positives or false
negatives.
• For users who want to evaluate smart contract analysis
tools, they can use these smart contracts as a benchmark
to evaluate the abilities of smart contract analysis tools.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF Jiuzhou WITH OTHER DATASETS
dataset Number ofcontracts
Kinds of
bugs Solidity version
Jiuzhou 176 49 0.4.26 to 0.6.2
ethernaut [43] 21 21 0.4.18 to 0.4.24
not-so-smart
-contracts [21] 25 12 0.4.9 to 0.4.23
SWC-registry [20] 114 33 0.4.0 to 0.5.0
capturetheether [44] 19 6 0.4.21
V. EVALUATION OF SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS TOOLS
A. Overview
We use smart contracts in the Jiuzhou dataset as a bench-
mark to evaluate the abilities of several smart contract analysis
tools. An analysis tool with good ability should be able to
analyze as many kinds of bugs as possible, and it should also
have good precision and recall rate. Therefore, we use the
following indicators to measure the abilities of the analysis
tools:
• Coverage. Coverage refers to the proportion of various
bugs that can be detected by the analysis tool in the
various bugs of Jiuzhou statistics. e.g., Oyente claims to
be able to detect 3 kinds of bugs (A-a-IO, D-a-R, F-c-T),
and these three kinds of bugs are in Jiuzhou statistics, so
Oyente’s coverage rate is 6% (3/49).
• Precision and recall. We use equation 1 and equation 2
to calculate the precision and recall rate. tp means that the
tool analyzes the existence of the bug and the bug does
exist. fp means that the tool analyzes the existence of
the bug but the bug does not exist. fn means that the bug
exists but the tool does not report the bug. The definitions
of tp, fp, and fn are shown in Table V.
TABLE V
DEFINITION OF tp, fp, fn
Actual
Analysis exist non-exist
exist tp fn
non-exist fp
Precision = (tp÷ (tp+ fp)) (1)
Recall = (tp÷ (tp+ fn)) (2)
We select and evaluate the tools according to the following
two criteria: 1) The tool is free to use. 2) The tool takes a
Solidity contract or compiled bytecode as input.
Table VI lists the 9 smart contract analysis tools we selected.
To the best of our knowledge, the number of tools evaluated
in this paper is not less than any existing work [18], [34],
[45]. When installing these tools, we use the quick (or easy)
method provided by the tools to install.
TABLE VI
THE SELECTED NINE SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS TOOLS FOR
EVALUATION
Tool Maian [46], Mythril [47], Osiris [48], Oyente [49], Securify [50],Slither [51], SmartCheck [52], Remix3 [53], SolidityCheck [54]
3We use the solidity static analysis of Remix
B. Coverage
We obtain the kinds of bugs that can be detected by a tool
according to its documents. For the tools without detailed
documents, we ask the developers via email. Fig 9 shows
the coverage of various tools. The coverage of Slither is the
highest, and the coverage of static code scanning tools (e.g.,
SmartCheck, SolidityCheck) is usually high. But the coverage
of tools based on control flow (or data flow) analysis is usually
low.
C. Precision and recall
Fig. 9. Coverage, recall and precision of various tools
The test cases we chose are the smart contracts containing
all kinds of bugs that a tool claims to be able to detect.
We instruct each analysis tool to analyze these contracts,
and then calculate the recall and precision of each tool.
The results are shown in Fig 9. Nine of the evaluated tools
including six bytecode-based tools ( [46], [47], [48], [49],
[50], [51]), and only three of them can work normally, and
the remaining three ( [46], [48], [49]) cannot analyze the
smart contracts of Solidity 0.4.26 and subsequent versions,
because they have not been updated for a long time, thus
no bugs are detected. This also reflects a real problem: when
the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) is updated, due to lack
of update and maintenance motivation, the bytecode-based
tools may not be able to adapt to the new version of EVM,
resulting in the limited availability of these tools. However,
since bytecode-based analysis tools usually use techniques
such as control flow (data flow) analysis [55], they usually
have higher precision.
D. Result analysis
Fig 9 shows that Slither detects most kinds of bugs and
has a good recall and precision rate. The analysis tool with
the highest precision is Mythril, and Remix has the highest
recall rate. Therefore, we recommend to use Mythril, Slither,
and Remix for contract analysis, and the installations of these
three tools are also very convenient (Slither: through pip3 [56]
installation, Mythril: through free plug-in in Remix IDE [36],
and Remix: through Remix IDE).
Our evaluation results are consistent with those in exist-
ing studies on evaluating smart contract analysis tools [18],
[34], [45]. Mythril and Slither are generally regarded as the
most effective tools. Our evaluation also has other interesting
findings: i) The crafted contracts can make these nine tools
produce more false positives and false negatives (compared
to the detection of non-crafted contracts). Among them, the
crafted contracts that were made according to strategy 1 make
all static code scanning tools have lower recall rate. The
contracts that were constructed according to strategy 2 make
all the evaluated tools have lower precision rate. The crafted
contracts that were built according to strategy 3 made some
evaluated tools have lower precision rate. ii) None of these
nine tools can detect the following 10 kinds of bugs: A-b-I,
D-b-P, E-a-H, E-a-SA, E-a-SW, F-a-S, F-b-DBC, G-a-II, H-
a-R, H-b-N. iii) Although most analysis tools currently use
techniques such as control flow (or data flow) analysis, static
code scanning tools are still valuable, because it is relatively
easy to develop static code scanning tools and they can detect
more kinds of bugs with better coverage. Moreover, they are
usually less affected by the new versions of EVM and Solidity.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Statistics and classification of smart contract bugs
Some studies focus on the statistics and classification of
smart contract bugs. Delmolino et al. [57] summarize four
common smart contract programming pitfalls by investigating
students’ mistakes in learning smart contract programming.
Atezi et al. [1] summarize 11 kinds of programming traps that
may lead to security bugs. They believe that one of the main
reasons for the continuous proliferation of smart contract bugs
is the lack of inductive documentation for smart contract bugs.
Chen et al. [17] collect smart contracts from Stack Exchange
and Ethereum, define 20 kinds of code smell for smart con-
tracts through manual analysis of smart contracts. Through in-
terviews with smart contract developers, Zou et al. [58] reveal
that smart contract developers still face many challenges when
developing contracts, such as rudimentary development tools,
limited programming languages, and difficulties in dealing
with performance issue. Sayeed et al. [59] divide the attacks on
Ethereum smart contracts into four categories according to the
attack principle and introduce 7 kinds of smart contract bugs,
and then they provide suggestions for implementing secure
smart contracts. Dingman et al. [16] first count the existing
bugs of Ethereum smart contract and then classify them using
the NIST framework. They count 49 kinds of bugs and then
classify 24 of them. Tikhomirov et al. [11] divide 20 kinds
of smart contract bugs into security, functional, operational,
and developmental, and give the severity of various bugs.
Smartdec [19] divides the Ethereum smart contract bugs into
three major categories: blockchain, language, and model. Their
classification covers a total of 33 kinds of smart contract bugs.
However, these studies only introduce partial kinds of bugs and
corresponding Detection criteria.
B. Smart contract datasets
Some organizations and researchers provide datasets of
smart contracts with bugs. SmartContractSecurity provides a
list of smart contract bugs, including 33 kinds of bugs and
buggy smart contracts. However, SmartContractSecurity does
not classify these bugs, and some kinds of bugs also lack
sample smart contracts [20]. crytic provides some examples
of Solidity security issues covering 12 kinds of bugs, but 11
of them have not been updated for two years [21]. Durieux
et al. [18] collect 47,587 Ethereum smart contracts, and then
manually mark the smart contract bugs in 69 of these con-
tracts. Based on the smart contract bug classification provided
by DASP [60], they divided the smart contract bugs in 69
contracts into ten categories. But these smart contract datasets
do not cover all kinds of smart contract bugs, and the number
of smart contracts in them is relatively small.
C. Evaluating smart contract analysis tools
Some studies focuses on evaluating the abilities of available
smart contract analysis tools. Parizi et al. [34] evaluate four
smart contract analysis tools using several commonly used
datasets. Durieux et al. [18] develop an execution framework
SmartBugs containing the smart contract analysis tools, and
then they use SmartBugs to evaluate 9 smart contract analysis
tools. Ghaleb et al. [45] implement SolidFI, a systematic
method for automatically evaluating smart contract analysis
tools. SolidFI first injects bugs into the contract, then runs
smart contract analysis tools to detect bugs, and finally iden-
tifies false positives and omissions generated by the tool. Our
evaluation results are similar to these work. Furthermore, as a
complement to existing research, we use the crafted contracts
as the test cases and also evaluate the performance of Remix.
By doing so, we have more interesting and useful observations.
VII. CONCLUSION
By collecting all known bugs in smart contracts, we classify
them based on the extension of IEEE Standard Classification
for Software Anomalies and give the detect criterion for each
kind of bugs. Moreover, we construct a comprehensive dataset
of vulnerable smart contracts that covers all these bugs, and
obtained new observations by using this dataset to evaluate the
state-of-the-art tools for analyzing smart contracts. In future
work, we will study how to formally define detection criteria.
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